


Colorado's Henry Collbran and the Roots of Early Korean Entrepreneurialism

By Don Southerton



Henry Collbran

The signs of American activity, in the capital alone, are evident upon every side. The Seoul Electric Car Company, the Seoul Electric Light Company, and the Seoul (Fresh Spring) Water Company have been created by American enterprises, backed by the "liveness" and 'cuteness (sic) of the two concessionaries...and pushed along by little diplomatic attentions upon the part of the American Minister.
Angus Hamilton, Korea, 1904

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Acknowledgements

This eBook's content is built upon considerable historical and contemporary research. Initial work began in 2002 while I was attending graduate school at the University of Colorado, Denver. Subsequently I incorporated research on Henry Collbran in both academic presentations in the mid-2000, and in my book *Intrepid Americans: Bold Koreans—Early Korean Trade, Concessions, And Entrepreneurship*, which was published in 2005.

Most recently, with my work centering on Korea-facing global business, I've revisited Henry Collbran's accomplishments in the context that he established some of the first successful business ties between Korea and the United States. Surprisingly, I see some of the same cross-cultural issues that surfaced during Collbran's time are equally relevant today. In both cases collaboration and strong partnership relationships were (and are) needed to succeed.

Finally, this publication would not be possible without the strong support of family, friends, and colleagues. I would especially like to express my appreciation to Diana Southerton Rudloff for proof reading and editing, and Anna Cash-Mitchell for design and eBook formatting.

Foreword

Korean brands have gained significant market shares in the United States and globally. American buyers find the products of high value and quality along with trendy designs. Another reason for this success with American consumers is that Korean brands build upon themselves—as a Hyundai or Kia car owner shops at Forever 21 while toting a Samsung Galaxy smartphone.

What may surprise many is Colorado's ties to Korea—Denver-area entrepreneurs provided early 20th century Korea with technology and know-how. The most successful of these capitalists was Henry Collbran (1852-1925). British-born, Collbran emigrated to America and found employment in the railroad industry, first in the southeastern United States and then in a number of diverse Colorado business ventures. On word that East Asia held rich untapped mining opportunities Collbran left Colorado for Korea in 1896 and, after passing up the opportunity to invest in a gold mine concession, the businessman was contracted to build Korea's first railroad from the port city of Incheon to the capital Seoul. After the railway project, and with the assistance of Horace Allen, the missionary-doctor turned head of the U.S. legation, Collbran and his junior associate Harry Bostwick secured the franchise to electrify sections of Seoul and build a modern streetcar system. Over the next several years, the entrepreneur gained credibility with the Korean monarchy and was granted additional concessions to operate the electric streetcar line, the power system, the first telephone system, a modern waterworks, a bank, a coin mint, and even a movie theater.

With the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan exerted protectorate control over the East Asian peninsula. In the wake of the change, Collbran sold his major municipal assets to British and Japanese firms at considerable profit. Turning to mining rights granted prior to the Japanese Protectorate, Collbran pressed American and Japanese officials for the rights to develop the massive Kapsan copper mine near the headwaters of the Yalu River, in addition to leasing the Suan gold mining operation.

With support from investors, including beer baron Adolph Coors, the mines employed over thirty Anglos, including Collbran's sons, along with five thousand Korean and Chinese laborers at peak production. Under pressure from the Japanese, the Kapsan mine of nearly one thousand square miles was sold in 1915. The Suan mine played out in 1924. Collbran died in his native England a year later, after spending his last decade living a life of leisure.

Introduction

Until 1883, Korean trade with the West was non-existent. During the early to mid 1800s, Western intrusion into Korea was unwelcome and unwanted. ¹ Korea's rulers and members of the aristocratic class of scholar-officials, the *yangban*, had carefully watched the effects of Western penetration into China and Japan. ² Korea's conservative leadership was appalled by their Asian neighbors' violation of the centuries old Confucian tenets and attempts at modernization. *Yangban* elites feared open borders would pollute Korea—a morally superior, self-sufficient, Neo-Confucian state. ³ Moreover, to forsake Confucian traditions and yield to Western culture was seen by conservative bureaucrat-officials as the “worst of all heterodoxies” and would in their eyes lead to the destruction of Korean society. ⁴

In February 1876, Japan succeeded in signing a treaty with Korea using tactics similar to ones employed by the United States and Commodore Perry with Japan in the 1850s. Japan's envoys demanded the Koreans sign the pact as drafted while under the threat of two warships and five transports of soldiers. Terms of the treaty included the opening of additional ports on the peninsula and recognizing Korea as an independent state that enjoyed sovereign rights. By including this independence clause, Japan intended to isolate Korea from its elder brother China. Additionally, Japanese officials felt that by building settlements on the peninsula they could keep Korea out of Western control, especially that of Russia. Although Korea entered into this new trade agreement with the Japanese, fundamentally little change came to its seclusion policy until the early 1880s.

With the abdication of the conservative Prince Regent Taewon'gun, to his son King Kojong in December 1873, rumors gradually spread to the West that suggested the new regime might be receptive to foreigners. In the late 1870s, America was aggressively expanding its overseas markets, partly in response to periods of domestic economic downturns. Under a mandate from U.S. Secretary of State James G. Blaine, Commodore Robert W. Shufeldt, on tour in Asia to promote American interests abroad, began negotiations to open Korea to trade with the United States. ⁵ Feeling the timing was right, King Kojong, too, sought a treaty with the United States. In May of 1882 both nations signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The Korean-American treaty heralded the growing involvement of Americans in the affairs of Korea. By the fall of 1884, the first American Presbyterian missionary, physician Horace Allen arrived on the peninsula and began to lay the groundwork for other missionaries to join him. Soon, a small cadre of Presbyterians and Methodist-Episcopalians joined Dr. Allen and adopted a “social gospel approach.” ⁶ In turn, this opened the door for American involvement in the Westernization and modernization of the peninsula.

Henry Collbran, Entrepreneur

Progressive reforms which begun in the wake of the *Kabo Kyôngjang*, the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), manifested in over 600 new regulations from those impacting the domestic postal system and military issues to gold mining, an exclusive domain of the monarch.⁷ In addition, China's on-going efforts to thwart American business interests evaporated with the Chinese military's defeat in the brief East Asian conflict. Dr. Allen, now head of the U. S. Legation, advised King Kojong that enlisting American capital through concessions might be a way of increasing the U.S. government interest in the peninsula and reduce Japanese domination.⁸ Korean concessions at this time, like those in China, were essentially a business favor granted by the conceding government to another nation's diplomats. The substantial profit and status of these enterprises caused considerable infighting among representatives of rival nations in Korea, not to mention the prestige among the vying nations for selection of a concession.⁹ With this in mind, Dr. Allen strove to gain concessions through vigorous lobbying efforts. In 1895, Allen's efforts proved successful with the Imperial Household granting the concession for the Unsan mining district to James R. Morse, an American who was president of the American Trading Company of New York and Yokomama, Japan.¹⁰ Upon the approval of the formal requests in April 1896, Morse controlled the rights to gold production for over 500 square miles in what is today part of North Korea.¹¹ Morse's twenty-five year agreement stipulated that twenty five per cent of the net profits be paid to the Imperial Household.¹²

Although not originally seeking a mining concern, Morse, nevertheless, traveled to New York and rendezvoused with an associate Leigh S. J. Hunt, a former Seattle newspaperman.¹³ It is in New York City that the men met Henry Collbran. British-born, but a naturalized citizen of the States, Collbran had traveled to America in 1881 and found employment in the railroad industry, first in the southeastern U.S., and then in successful Colorado ventures in Denver and the Cripple Creek mining region. In the summer of 1896 after severing his railroad affiliations, Collbran set off on a vacation to his native London with a quick stop over in New York. Eager to find backers Morse and Hunt persuaded Collbran to accept a one-third option on the Unsan gold-mining concession.¹⁴ Collbran returned to Colorado where his family resided, hired a mining engineer, and headed to Korea. Although winter weather meant bitter winds, frozen ground, ice and snow, Collbran was soon on the East Asian peninsula trekking across the Unsan mining district, the massive 500 square mile concession. The team confirmed the presence of gold—much in hard to refine low-grade quartz veins. Family sources tell of how Collbran lamented over the prospect of training Koreans in Western mining technology and the excessive cost of transportation.¹⁵ Collbran promptly dropped his options and accepted a loss of \$10,000 for the preliminary investigation.¹⁶ Morse, likewise, felt Koreans could

not be taught the necessary mining skills and the operation would require the recruitment of costly Cornish miners. Morse sold his rights to the remaining partner Leigh Hunt, who in contrast, optimistically felt Koreans would learn the new technology. Hunt, for his efforts and foresight, saw the mining company grow into the richest gold mine in Asia.¹⁷

No sooner had Collbran returned to Seoul than a new opportunity arose. Morse's original interest in Korea had actually been a railroad concession and he again benefited from the efforts of Dr. Allen who secured the concession for the nation's first railway from the port of Chemulpo (Incheon) to Seoul, a twenty-five mile standard gauge stretch. ¹⁸ Morse, not wishing to anger the Japanese who also sought the concession and were an important aspect of his trading business, wisely asked Collbran to handle the project. ¹⁹ After accepting, Collbran returned to Denver and was back in Korea by October of 1897 with a junior partner Harry H. Bostwick of San Francisco. Completed in a year and at a cost of \$1.5 million, the railway was constructed in standard gauge, which meant that American-built Pullman cars traversed the rails in contrast to Japanese railways with narrow-gauge track and European compartment-style cars. ²⁰ This would set the standard across the peninsula. Despite labor issues with the Japanese skilled laborers who often walked off the job on the slightest provocation, the project opened the door to future opportunity for Collbran and his colleague Bostwick. When the railroad was near completion, Morse sold his rights to a group of Japanese businessman. American missionary Horace G. Underwood later remarked with national pride that as the railways soon crossed the peninsula, patrons rode in cars made in Wilmington, Delaware, drawn by a Baldwin locomotive, upon steel rails from the Carnegie works, nailed to Oregon ties, and secured with American spikes.²¹

Electric Trolleys to Waterworks

In 1884, King Kojong contracted the Edison Light Company to electrify the Kyôngkuk Palace. Completed in 1887 by technicians from Thomas Edison's laboratory, generators powered the palace's lighting and operated electrical devices to the amazement of the king and court. For example, an engineer on the project Henry English once remarked that while wiring the palace, as a lark to entertain onlookers, the technician announced he would kill the frogs in the palace pond and then revive them. With a crowd watching, English wired and briefly shocked the pond water, paralyzing the helpless frogs. Then, after turning off the electric circuit, the stunned frogs slowly regained consciousness and resumed swimming, while wide-eyed Koreans bowed to Henry English in amazement.²² Several years later, in 1893, a second electric plant was built for the Changdok Palace. Reports of the time by Dr. Allen told that the incandescent lights were most often used for court meetings held during the evening hours.

By the late 1890s, the Korean monarch, now elevated to official title of emperor, sought to modernize Seoul with electricity and telephone service. Kojong idealistically hoped that the technology would strengthen his country economically. Plans were made and the Seoul Electric Company (*Hansông Chôn'gi Hwesa*) was established to operate an electrical and telephone system. In addition, a Korean official visiting Washington, D.C. who had witnessed firsthand the horse-drawn rail system converted to electric trolley cars convinced the Emperor to build Asia's first streetcar system, complete with a private car for the ruler. Upon hearing news of the concession, Collbran and Bostwick pressured Dr. Allen to broker the deal. To avoid losing the deal to the others vying for the concession, the cagy U.S. government official arranged for the partners to meet with Korean officials at Allen's residence to ensure secrecy and hopefully, success. When the contract was signed in February 1899 for the joint rights to operate the system, Allen triumphantly boasted it was his finest piece of work accomplished in a decade and a half on the peninsula. As with the Incheon-Seoul railroad project, the Americans mobilized quickly. By the spring of 1899 streetcars of the Seoul Electric Car Company were running over a stretch of track between the palace and the tomb of the late Queen Min. Upon completion of the trolley line, Kojong was quite pleased since it was the first electric trolley in Asia. (see Fig. 1) Interestingly, according to the Collbran family records, the monarch, although in possession of his own private car, never rode the system.²³ Upon opening of the trolley line, Kojong agreed to sit in his car but would not let it move. Soon afterwards, electric lighting began sprouting up to illuminate the rail lines, stores, and homes of high-ranking officials. Each light bulb was ten watts and a monthly fee of 1.6 Won (the price of twenty five pounds of rice) was charged for each light.²⁴ By 1900, the Namdaemun (Great South Gate) to Sôdaemun (Great West Gate) line was also completed. (Fig. 2) Fare varied according to distance and class on the trolley with the area in the middle of the

car near the windows designated as first class and the rest of the car as second class.²⁵



Fig. 1 Seoul Tramway c. 1903 (Courtesy of *Choson Ilbo*)

Stories about how Koreans became accustomed to the streetcars abound. Educating the populace in Western mass transit had some drawbacks. For example, many Koreans followed common etiquette and removed their shoes prior to riding the streetcar, only to find the foot apparel missing at the end of the line. The streetcar system soon became extremely popular among the Koreans in spite of its high fare relative to an average worker's wages. It was remarked that by 1905 the heaviest traffic was on stone-fighting days, a traditional amusement that drew thousands of spectators near the city gates. (see Fig. 2) On these occasions an estimated 34,000 riders, double the daily average, used the Seoul system.²⁶



Fig. 2 Namdaemun (Great South Gate) with streetcar and electric power lines poles

Mounting Challenges

Collbran's efforts on the Asian peninsula were not without challenges. Emperor Kojong's reluctance to grant additional concessions for a modern waterworks and additional mining endeavors was compounded by Japanese and Russian maneuvering for control over the peninsula. Furthermore, the Emperor was constantly pressed for cash. This meant that by 1900 when the Boxer Rebellion erupted in China, Kojong saw the need to bolster his army and agreed to issue an often discussed "Greater Concession" for the entire peninsula, excluding pre-existing arrangements like Hunt's Oriental Consolidated gold mine in Ulsan. For the new mining rights, Kojong demanded a loan of \$5 million, but the turmoil and instability of the Chinese rebellion frightened away any prospective western investors. Meanwhile, Kojong's debt to Collbran's firm for the construction projects in Seoul grew. By 1901 the emperor owed Collbran and Bostwick in excess of \$800,000 secured with mortgages on the electric and streetcar companies and with the partners also holding \$330,000 of Kojong's cash in a private bank. One remedy Collbran sought was a construction project for the Russians in Port Arthur. Terms of the prospective project included selling the electric properties to the Russians, eager to gain more interests in Seoul. Collbran and his partners decided against this plan since the streetcar system produced \$2,000 in profit per month. The American partners even tried pressuring the US State Department to dispatch the Navy to occupy a Korean port in order to force Kojong to pay.

Aside from the debt issue, Collbran and Bostwick did press on with the expansion of on-going ventures, such as efforts to meet an ever-growing demand for electricity, additional streetcars lines, and building the first film theater in Korea, one of their more innovative pursuits. American Elias Burton-Holmes had introduced cinema to the Korean royal family in 1899. Soon afterwards, Collbran and his firm recognized the need to maintain valuable, skilled workers and began showing films as an employee perk. In the past, the Americans had employed dancers, jugglers, and other performers to provide entertainment to their workers. However, the success of private film screenings for the workers pushed Collbran to recognize the profit in expanding into the movie theater business. Beginning in June 1903, Collbran began luring moviegoers from the streetcars into a makeshift theater at the Seoul Electric Company Machine Warehouse near the Dongdaemun (Great East Gate); the show's admission fee was three cents (US).

Collbran's other enterprises included a telephone franchise, a coin mint, and a bank—all businesses managed from the stately Collbran-Bostwick Development Company building. (Fig. 3) For many, the tower of the Collbran-Bostwick building, complete with a flagpole displaying the Stars and Stripes, symbolized America's presence in Korea. The tower's time clock even served as the official Western-style timepiece for the city.

Collbran's business interest proved to be wide-ranging and open to any opportunity. One unusual example was when Kojong felt he needed a "navy." A government official asked Collbran to review the submitted bids as a favor. The savvy businessman consented but also submitted his own bid to those under review. Family stories tell of Collbran winning the selection due to an additional feature, a searchlight. To fulfill the contract, the American quickly purchased a Chinese Customs cruiser and added the lighting. The family story concludes with mention that the Emperor Kojong appointed some twenty Korean Admirals for his new "navy."²⁷




Fig. 3 Seoul Offices of the Collbran-Bostwick Development Office, c. 1905.
(Photo from *Things Korean, a Collection of Sketches and Anecdotes, Missionary and Diplomatic*)

Unfortunately, the constant pressure exerted on the monarchy and the diplomatic maneuvering pursued by Collbran and Bostwick regarding the outstanding debt took its toll. When word reached the masses, open protests erupted. In October 1903, a three-day riot was staged. In the frenzy, an American manager of the electric firm was killed and property destroyed. To compound the unrest, in January 1904, an accident with a *jinrikisha* driver who refused to yield to an oncoming streetcar was killed when the much larger vehicle's icy brakes failed to stop in time. A crowd gathered at the accident site, overturned the streetcar and required a platoon of U.S. Marines to break up the near riot.²⁸

Meanwhile with hope dwindling that Collbran and Bostwick could resolve the Kojong debt, the onset of the Russo-Japanese War on February 8, 1904 finally forced the ruler to take action or perhaps lose everything to the Japanese.

Several days after Japan's battle fleet steamed into Incheon harbor and troops landed in mass, one of the emperor's chief negotiators accompanied by William Sands, an advisor to the ruler, met in secret at Collbran's home to settle the debt.²⁹ Terms reached included a one-time payment by Kojong of \$375,000, and an equal partnership in the electric company, renamed the American Korean Electric Company. ³⁰ A construction contract was also signed awarding Collbran's firm the waterworks project with an agreement that the Korean Customs commissioner compensate the Americans \$100,000 annually for ten years. Finally, to settle the remainder of the Kojong debt, the negotiators made provisions that gave Collbran's firm a broad monopoly over Korea's mineral resources, with rights to extend over the next ten years. Although not specified, it is assumed that as with the other concessions some compensation would also go to the monarchy for the mining rights.

Golden Years

When the war ended in 1905 and Korea became a protectorate of Japan, Collbran and Bostwick launched a number of ventures including expanding the electric system and beginning construction on the modern waterworks. Moreover, a day after the war ended one of Collbran's son Arthur, a 1902 graduate of the Colorado School of Mines, began a trek north to the Kapsan district. Here at the headwaters of the Yalu River, a massive copper mining operation extended over at least 1,000 square miles. Upon the younger Collbran's return to Seoul, the Collbran and Bostwick Development Company notified the Korean government of their wish to execute the mining contracts granted to settle Kojong's debt. The Japanese officials, now in control of the country, refused the demand.

Undaunted, over the next two years the American entrepreneurs pressed forward with their utility development, especially at the water filtration plant, while also assuming control of a former British run gold mining operation in Suan.³¹ Finally, in 1908 after years of international negotiations involving the American, British, and the Japanese governments a compromise was reached. To gain the massive Kapsan mining operations, Collbran and Bostwick sold their newly completed \$1.5 million waterworks to a British syndicate while the Japanese purchased the Americans' half interest in the electric company for \$620,000. In addition, \$150,000 was paid to the remaining partner Emperor Kojong, now powerless under Japanese rule. Content with his profits, Harry Bostwick returned to the states to reside in San Francisco.³²

In April 1908, Collbran incorporated his new mining firm, the Seoul Mining Company. Interestingly, the company was headquartered in Denver, Colorado where one of the largest stockholders was his son Herbert's father-in-law, beer baron Adolph Coors. With his sons Arthur and Herbert overseeing daily operations of the two profitable Korean mining operations, the elder Collbran retired to his native London where he lived the remainder of his life in leisure. In 1915, the Kapsan copper mine, amidst constant harrying by Japanese officials, was sold to the Kuhara Mining Company for \$1.5 million.³³ The Suan operation lasted until 1924 when the ore played out whereby the mine was closed as were the last of the Collbran holdings on the peninsula.³⁴ Henry Collbran died the next year at age 73.

Conclusion

The employees are largely Koreans, both in the powerhouse and on the line everywhere. It is the unanimous opinion of the Americans who operate the road, that the Koreans make competent hands in every department of the works. This is a striking testimonial...in setting the question whether, as so many foreigners think, the Korean is capable of attaining proficiency in the field of applied science.

Homer B. Hulbert, *The Passing of Korea*, 1906

Henry Collbran and his ventures served as vital developers in bringing Western technology and innovation to Korea. Even though Collbran's early opinion of the Korean worker was less than flattering, echoing a stereotype that they were lazy and non-trainable, that opinion changed. Years later in a brief submitted to the U.S. State Department, Collbran remarked he had erred in failing to appreciate the Korean worker.³⁵ Instead, he found them highly employable. Collbran recognized Koreans' hard-working, ambitious traits, which were harnessed to construct and then operate the mining ventures, streetcar line, electric power facilities, waterworks, coin mint, and even the cinema. In particular, these workers demonstrated values rooted in Confucianism. This included employer paternalism built upon traditional concepts of *anjeong* (stability or security) and *poram* (worthiness), not to mention, ethnic values that included working long hours.³⁶

With relevance to today's joint ventures between Korean and American companies, most of the Collbran-Bostwick Development enterprises were, in fact, partnerships. For example, the Seoul Electric Company included early Korean organizers Yi Kûnbæ, Kim Tusûng, and Yi Ch'æ Yôn. (see Fig. 4) For a smooth venture on the peninsula, Korean involvement proved invaluable with many of these individuals coming from educated lineages. These workers in the employment of the Collbran-Bostwick enterprises learned much about Western business and new technology. Sadly, it would not be until after the setbacks of the Japanese Colonial Period, the post-World War II split of the country, and Korean War that Korean entrepreneurial activities were unrestrained and allowed to soar.



Fig. 4 Seoul Electric Company official Yi Ch'ae Yôn (leaning on the sledge hammer) with Dr. Horace Allen (the tall gentleman with glasses and the derby) at the September 12, 1898 dedication of the Seoul electric streetcar project. (Photographer unknown. Courtesy of Dr. Robert Sayers)

To conclude, outside the importance introduction of modern technology and know-how, perhaps more significant was the establishment of western style entrepreneurialism on the Korean peninsula. The Koreans were, in turn, astute learners of these new business practices while building upon their own traditional values. It comes as no surprise that today entrepreneurial spirit, innovation, and trend-setting technology are now trademarks of brands like Hyundai, Kia, Samsung, and LG.

About the Author

Don Southerton has held a life-long interest in Korea and the rich culture of the country. He has authored numerous publications with topics centering on culture, new urbanism, entrepreneurialism, and early U.S.-Korean business ventures. Southerton also extensively writes and comments on modern Korean business culture and its impact on global organizations. His firm, Bridging Culture Worldwide, provides consulting, strategy, and training to Korea-based global business.

Endnotes

¹ Western thought entered Korea in the eighteenth century through the preaching and doctrine of Catholicism. Chai-Sik Chung noted that their own intellectuals, not Western missionaries, first introduced Catholicism to Korea. Vigorous debates among the scholar class over the compatibility of the two belief systems led to what Don Baker labeled a “Catholic-Confucian divide”—orthodoxy versus heterodoxy. See Don Baker, “A Different Thread: Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, and Catholicism in a Confucian World,” *Culture and the State in Late Chosôn Korea*, eds. Ja Hyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 199-230. See also Chai-Sik Chung, *A Korean Encounter with the Western World* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 1995), pp. 39-42 and 72-73; and “Tradition and Ideology: Korea’s Initial Response to Christianity from a Religious and Sociological Perspective,” *Asian Culture* 4 (October 1988): 115-146.

² Romanization of Korean terms and names follows the norm among historians to use the McCune-Reischauer system, except in instances in which other spellings have become commonly accepted, such as with Kim Il Sung and Incheon.

³ Martina Deuchler argued in *The Confucian Transformation of Korea* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992) that Neo-Confucianism was “the driving force” in the dynamism which led to the establishment of the Chosôn dynasty (1392-1910) by intellectuals. Moreover, she stated that Neo-Confucian learning became an ideological tool used by bureaucrats to “reshape the sociopolitical environment” and promote order.

⁴ Chung, *A Korean Encounter with the Western World*, p. 41.

⁵ James Blaine, a Yankee from Maine, was influenced by a maritime constituency to promote trade in the Pacific. Furthermore, domestic economic panics of the 1870s forced American manufacturers to look for foreign markets, a cause heralded by Blaine. See Edward P. Crapol, *James G. Blaine: Architect of Empire* (Wilmington, De: SR Books, 2000).

⁶ Gil Soo Han, “The Rise of Western Medicine and Revival of Traditional Medicine in Korea: A Brief History” *Korean Studies* 21 (1997): 97; and Chung-shin Park, “Protestantism in Late Confucian Korea: Its Growth and Historical Meaning,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 8 (1992): 141.

⁷ Homer Hulbert, *Hulbert’s History of Korea*, ed. Clarence Weems, vol. 2 (New York: Hillary House, 1962), p. 284. See also Edward Wagner, Carter Eckert, et al, *Korea: Old and New, A History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 224-225.

⁸ Horace N. Allen, *Things Korean: A Collection of Sketches and Anecdotes Missionary and Diplomatic* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1908), p. 232. For a fascinating study on Allen's work in Korea see Fred Harvey Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944). Another often cited source is the Allen Manuscripts in the New York Public Library.

⁹ William Franklin Sands, *Undiplomatic Memories: The Far East 1896-1904* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1930), pp. 197-198. See also Ki-Baek Lee, *A New History of Korea*, trans. Edward W. Wagner with Edward J. Shultz (Seoul, Korea: Ilchokak Publishers, 1984), p. 301 for a chart on Korean concessions granted 1883-1898.

¹⁰ Donald N. Clark, *Living Dangerously in Korea: The Western Experience 1900-1950* (Norwalk, CT: EastBridge Press, 2003), Chapter 11, pp. 222-239 gives an in depth study of the Oriental Consolidated Mining Company. Moreover, Harold F. Cook, *Pioneer American Businessman in Korea; The Life and Times of Walter Davis Townsend* (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1981) describes Morse's business endeavors in Korea.

¹¹ Edwin W. Mills, "Gold Mining in Korea," *The Korean Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 7 (1916): 23-24.

¹² Spencer J. Palmer, "American Gold Mining in Korea's Unsan District," *Pacific Historical Review* 31 (1962): 381.

¹³ Dean Alexander Arnold, *American Economic Enterprises in Korea, 1895-1939* (New York: Arno Press, 1976), pp. 56-57.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 65. And, Dean Alexander Arnold, "Collbran of Colorado: Concessionaire in Korea," *Colorado Quarterly* (Summer 1959): 7.

¹⁵ J.S. Collbran, "Notes on Henry Collbran," Henry Collbran Papers, Library of the State of Historical Society of Colorado, (hereafter called the Collbran Papers) MSS 128. Box 2, FF# 12. p. 1a.

¹⁶ Arnold, *American Economic Enterprises in Korea*, p. 73.

¹⁷ Palmer, "American Gold Mining in Korea's Unsan District," 382-383.

¹⁸ Allen, *Things Koreans*, pp. 233-234.

¹⁹ Sands, *Undiplomatic Memories*, p. 203.

²⁰ Ada E. Leeke and Evelyn Shaw, *When American Came to Korea* (Pine Hill Press: Freeman, South Dakota, 1991), p. 167.

²¹ Horace G. Underwood, *The Call of Korea: Political-Social-Religious* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1908), p. 24.

²² Leeke, *When American Came to Korea*, p. 168.

²³ John S. Collbran and Eleanor C. Merrick, "Notes on a Conversation between John S. Collbran and Eleanor C. Merrick on November 26, 1969 Concerning the Collbran Family History," Collbran Papers, MSS 128, Box 2, FF# 17, p. 2.

²⁴ Yi Kyu-tae, *Modern Transformation of Korea*, trans. Sung Tong-mahn, Charles Goldberg, et al., (Seoul: Sejong Publishing Company, 1970), p. 300.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 310. Interestingly, the early Korean streetcars are similar in design to that of the present day San Francisco "California" style cable cars, although the latter operate by a cable system and not electricity. Nevertheless, the car's seating layout and configuration appear to be the same.

²⁶ Hulbert, *Hulbert's History of Korea*, pp. 277-278.

²⁷ J.S. Collbran, "Notes on Henry Collbran," Collbran Papers, MSS 128. Box 2, FF # 12, p. 2.

²⁸ Arnold, "Collbran of Colorado," 11.

²⁹ William Franklin Sands (1874-1946). In 1900, Sands, the former secretary of the American legation in Seoul, became advisor to the Emperor Kojong, a post he maintained until 1904. A friend of Collbran and Bostwick, Sands' views most often were pro-Korean.

³⁰ Americans called the company the American Korean Electric Company; Korean sources often reverse the name order.

³¹ Mills, "Gold Mining in Korea," 24.

³² Beginning in 1907 Harry Bostwick's name appeared in the San Francisco business directories and is listed as a "capitalist." In 1908 and 1909, Harry along with brother Frank are also listed as partners in the real estate firm, Barker, Knickerbocker, and Bostwick. Ashbrook Lincoln, "San Francisco Bay-Area Views of Russian Aggression in Far East, 1903-1905," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 30 (1951): 205.

³³ Clark, *Living Dangerously in Korea*, p. 228 footnote.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 230.

³⁵ Arnold, *American Economic Enterprises in Korea*, p. 73.

³⁶ Kyeyong Park, *The Korean American Dream: Immigrants and Small Business in New York City* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). Park notes that Korean immigrants to America employed old ideologies and a propensity to establish small businesses as a route to the American dream.